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   The Crisis consists precisely in the fact that old is dying and the new cannot be born;
in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass.
– Antonio Gramsci (Prison Notebooks, 1996)
I. Introduction
The sequence of events that is still denoted the “Asian” financial crisis has now produced a
global economic crisis. It began with the destabilization of several Southeastern Asian currencies in
summer 1997.  By summer 1998, Wall Street had lost momentum. The IMF’s inability to stop
Russia’s mid-summer crisis then turned the cracks in Wall Street’s dizzy consensus concerning the
end of history into gaping holes.  Traders worldwide ran for safety, leading to spasmodic new rounds
of currency and equity-market collapses in Latin America and Asia. 
Merely documenting what has happened will fill volumes. We focus here first on the
architecture of the crisis as a whole, and then on one case: South Korea.  There are several reasons
for choosing Korea. First, it occupies the pivotal place in the sequence of events: the tsunami that
built up in Southeast Asia hit the Republic of Korea with full force in fall 1997, and lingered there
through the spring before assaulting New York, Russia, and Latin America in summer 1998. Second,
Korea is perhaps the prototype for the Asian developmental model. Third, we have observed the
Korean situation firsthand. In effect, Korea provides us with a lens for viewing the innumerable
layers of crisis in the current situation.
Our central point is that the essence of the current crisis is its inherent structural complexity;
it cannot be reduced to a single mechanism operating at a single behavioral level, but involves
instead a series of interlinked conflicts operating at several levels simultaneously. Understandably,
most analysts have focused on one or the other contributing causes in this crisis.  Some have tried to
identify a flawed microfoundational mechanism of the “Asian model”—for example, Krugman’s
(1998) model of perverse borrower-lender relations due to unwise government guarantees. Others
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have emphasized national policy mistakes—for example, Grabel’s (1998) argument that over-
reliance on hard-currency foreign loans without controls over portfolio investment flows triggered
many recent financial crises. Still others have emphasized flaws in the structure of international
markets – for example, Paul Davidson’s (1998) view that the Asian crisis reflects liquidity-shortage
chickens coming home to roost in the post-Bretton Woods world.
We find much to agree with in these works. But we do not think the crisis in its current form
could have resulted only from problematic microeconomic design, flawed national strategy, or a
perverse international environment. Rather, the current crisis has arisen simultaneously as a conflict
between international and national forces, on one hand, and as localized struggles between capital
and labor, on the other.
The crisis is thus inherently international, national, and class-based all at once. In our view,
no single behavioral cause or design flow can be identified as having nudged the End-of-History ship
toward the iceberg. Instead, this crisis has arisen due to long-term contradictions embedded in the
structures and policies of the global Neoliberal regime, political and economic contradictions internal
to affected Asian nations, and the destructive short-term dynamics of liberalized global financial
markets.  The system is broken at so many levels that serious study of the structured complexity of
global conflict must precede proposals for institutional and policy change designed to solve the many
problems created by the crisis.
The sections that follow first discuss the transition from the Golden Age system to the global
Neoliberal regime, and then the myths and reality of the East Asian economic model. We then
provide an overview of the Asian crisis, emphasizing the fundamental structural incompatibility
between this model and the Neoliberal regime. After critically evaluating the use of mainstream
equilibrium-based models to understand the Asian crisis, we provide a more detailed discussion of
the crisis in Korea. We end with some reflections on policy.
II.  From the Golden Age to the Global Neoliberal Regime
The so-called Golden Age of modern capitalism, lasting from World War II through the early
1970s, was built on the foundation of state regulation of the economy.
1  In the international financial
system, exchange rates were fixed relative to the dollar, which in turn was pegged to gold.
Significant barriers to capital mobility were in place. Domestically, governments in the North
operated managed capitalist systems. They controlled aggregate demand to meet unemployment and
inflation targets; they regulated  business and finance, established rights for workers, redistributed
income via the tax/transfer system, and underwrote a social safety net.  In the workplace, a period of
relative labor-capital peace was achieved through widespread adoption of what has been termed the
Fordist production model. Economic output was centered on capital-intensive goods manufactured in
large-scale facilities by largely unionized workforces. Many workers obtained higher real wages and
gains in job security and workplace safety. Admittedly, experience in the countries of the South was
extremely varied, in large part because many nations were emerging from neo-colonial domination
by European powers.  Fueled by high Northern growth rates, much of the South did achieve
sustained expansion.
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The Golden Age’s increasing prosperity did not, however, create capitalism without conflict.
 The struggle within each nation among firms and workers over wages, relative prices, and working
conditions continued unabated. And economic conflict among nations did not cease. During the
Golden Age, the capital-labor class conflict was mediated by gains-sharing contracts that raised real
wages; and national-capital conflicts were obviated by the Pax Americana within which the Bretton
Woods system operated. These resolutions were, to some extent, mutually reinforcing.  The top
portion of Figure 1 demonstrates this point, using arrows to indicate causal influence. That is, the
fixed-exchange rate regime facilitated the pursuit of Keynesian demand management built on
redistribution and high employment; this created a political environment in which the public
supported these policies, ensuring their continued implementation. Firms meanwhile engaged in co-
respective competition based on (and thus expanding) the use of high-wage, high-productivity labor.
But eventually this solution came undone. The balance of power between domestic
governments and real and financial capital seeking international mobility swung decisively toward
the latter in the 1970s.  This in turn legitimized a free-market revolution in economic policy, pursued
most successfully by conservative politicians and economists in the US and the UK in the early
1980s. With the Golden Age in ruins, the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations put the Neoliberal
regime into place.
The defining elements of the Neoliberal regime are deregulation, privatization, and
liberalization—that is, a contraction of the state’s role in an increasingly integrated global economic
system. The hallmark of Neoliberalism is the pursuit of unregulated markets almost everywhere for
almost everything.  These economic relations are supported in the ideological realm by the
dominance of Neoliberal economic and political theory—even within economics departments in
Asian countries.
Guiding the emergence of this order are the G7 nations, especially the United States, together
with the multinational corporations and banks of the North (and, increasingly, of the South).
Supporting these agents are domestic elites, North and South, and a set of four multilateral
institutions--the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization,
and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The United States has stood at the apex of global
economic power both in the Golden Age and in the Neoliberal regime. The hallmark of the
Neoliberal order, however, is the power of global rentiers.  The past two decades have seen the
construction of a globe-girdling network of financial centers and off-shore financial havens. These
centers and firms provide an infrastructure for financial speculation; the instability of exchange rates
and interest rates in the Neoliberal regime provide the requisite motivation.
The threat of nearly instantaneous cross-border capital movements triggered by speculative
motives in turn has imposed severe constraints on state economic policies. Indeed, managed
capitalism has been moving in the direction of laissez-faire capitalism. Monetary policy now aims at
lowering inflation, not unemployment; safety-net and social-welfare programs have been cut; the
counter cyclical role of government expenditure in sustaining aggregate demand has been virtually
eliminated; business has been deregulated; and workers’ rights have been restricted. The nations of
the South are expected to follow suit if they expect to continue to trade with the North.
Economic conflict in the workplace is also resolved differently than in the Golden Age. The4
Fordist production model has been largely replaced by the “post-Fordist” model, featuring substantial
use of subcontracting, often with bid-price competition, just-in-time inventory methods, and out-
sourcing. Together with the erosion of income-transfer programs and state protection for workers,
this has led to less gain-sharing by firms; regressive redistribution from labor to capital thus has
helped sustain profits just they were being eroded by increased interest payments. Many firms have
taken advantage of the ease of capital mobility to adopt the global factory model, in which
components are manufactured and assembled in multiple off-shore locations.
Advocates of Neoliberal policies have argued that they would yield better national and global
economic performance than in the Golden Age--higher GDP, employment, and productivity growth.
Technology transfers from the North would let less developed nations converge to the developed
nations’ level of economic performance. Such projections have proven to be wide of the mark.
Neoliberal policies have generated higher profits for some multinational firms and banks, and much
higher returns for rentiers throughout the world.  But for most people, Neoliberalism’s promised
benefits have not materialized.  In the North, economic growth rates have been well below historical
trends.  European unemployment has hovered near depression levels for a decade while in the US,
median real wages have substantially declined and inequality has risen dramatically since the late
1970s.  In much of the South, the situation is even worse. Latin America had its “lost decade” after
the Mexican debt default of August 1982. Eastern Europe’s economies have stumbled badly after a
widely heralded start.
The most recent Trade and Development Report of (UNCTAD, 1998) points out that global
economic growth averaged just 1.9% between 1990 and 1995; it rose to 3.0% in 1996, and further to
3.2% in 1997—largely because the effects of the Asian crisis were not yet felt. But it is projected to
fall to 2.0% in 1998, perhaps to fall further in 1999. In the entire 1990-97 period, the economies of
the developed nations have grown more slowly, on average, than the global economy as a whole—an
average of 1.7% in the 1990-95 period, 2.5% in 1996, 2.7% in 1997, and 1.8% in 1998 (projected).
East and Southeast Asia and the US are the only areas of the globe to have generated consistently
high growth rates in the Neoliberal era.
Why is Global Growth Stagnant?  
Weak global growth rates in the Neoliberal regime can be traced to two mutually reinforcing,
fundamental problems: (1) chronically insufficient growth in aggregate demand; and its flip-side, (2)
chronic excess aggregate supply.  The structural tendency of the Neoliberal regime to generate
chronically inadequate aggregate demand growth provides the context within which the outbreak of
the Asian crisis can be best understood.
Here we identify five interconnected roots of weak global aggregate demand deeply
embedded in the structures of the Neoliberal regime.  First are a series of forces holding down wages
and mass consumption. These include the threat of capital mobility (which, in the case of FDI,  is
underestimated by the measured volume of capital mobility)
2; rising import competition; and chronic
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job “churning,” which can be traced both to technical change and to new corporate strategies of
downsizing and re-engineering. In effect, changes in laws and technology made it feasible for
multinational corporations to substitute low-wage Southern labor for equally-skilled but higher-paid
Northern labor.
3 It bears emphasis that these anti-worker corporate policies were made possible by
two prior shifts in government policy: the erosion of support for unions and regulated labor-capital
bargaining; and the slow deconstruction of social safety nets, which made workers’ exit option less
attractive.
The second factor depressing global growth rates is the high real interest rate regime created
by independent central banks and reinforced by global rentiers. This monetary-policy shift coincided
with the elections of Reagan and Thatcher, who helped create a secular increase in the reserve army
of the unemployed and thus forced the costs of the global crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s onto
workers. This shift in monetary policy was reinforced by the rising power of global rentiers in the
1980s in the wake of financial deregulation. The rentiers were able to punish countries that used
policy to pursue growth and employment rather than low inflation.
A third factor was the emergence of restrictive fiscal policy. The high interest-rate regime
played a role: rising interest payments eat up larger shares of public spending, all else equal.  But
more important, lower taxes and a shrinking social safety net have been the political order of the day.
 The importance given to austere fiscal policy was recognized explicitly in the criteria established
under the Maastricht treaty.  Further, rentiers and independent central banks together punished
countries that ran excessive deficits.
A fourth factor was the level and character of global investment.  Investment spending in the
Neoliberal regime has been, on average, low, due to high real interest rates and sluggish aggregate-
demand growth.  But beyond this, much investment was labor-saving rather than capacity-
expanding: thus, the increased aggregate demand created by investment spending has often been
counteracted by cuts in worker consumption caused by the job and wage losses associated with this
investment.
The final factor explaining low aggregate demand is the role of the IMF. As more developing
countries experienced national insolvency, the IMF has increasingly played a new role—lender of
last resort to countries with inadequate foreign exchange reserves. The IMF has invariably mandated
austerity macroeconomic policies plus Neoliberal restructuring in return for its money. The growth
of IMF austerity programs around the developing world (not to mention the self imposed macro-
economic austerity programs adopted by countries like Brazil to avoid falling under the control of the
IMF) has left global aggregate demand even more constrained.
Why hasn’t supply adapted to reduced demand growth? In the Neoliberal regime, demand
problems have generated destructive competitive processes which, in turn, have aggravated demand
deficiencies. The Neoliberal regime has replaced the “co-respective competition” (to use
Schumpeter’s phrase) among large firms in the Golden Age--characterized by long-term planning
horizons, restrained capital-labor conflict, and avoidance of those dimensions of competition that
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undercut industry-wide profitability,  with “coercive competition” based on predatory pricing,
overinvestment, waves of technological innovation that render recently constructed capital goods
obsolete (and the debt used to finance them potentially unpayable), and aggressive regimes of labor
policy.
4 The key is to understand why the Neoliberal regime has forced competition into a coercive
and destructive mode.
The modern global economy has a discrete number of key manufacturing, service and
financial industries that dominate international trade and investment--such as banking, insurance,
autos, airplanes, computers, semiconductors, electric appliances, steel, and machine tools. Mature
industrialized countries have large multinational corporations that desire to maintain their traditional
domination of these key industries.  In addition, however, developing countries moving up the
technology/productivity/value-added ladder--such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan — must establish
footholds, followed by strongholds, in many of these same industries. So each new wave of entrants,
like the countries of South East Asia in recent decades, further crowds these global markets.  If
global and Northern aggregate-demand growth was strong, this problem would be contained to some
degree. But, as we have seen,  it is not; the Neoliberal regime severely constrains the growth of
demand. In the absence of exit by established players, waves of new entrants leads to chronic
overcapacity, low profits for many firms (except at cyclical peaks), fierce competition, and a
deflationary bias in global commodity markets.
Given the centrality of these markets and the sunk costs required to enter them, most
competitors try to stay in the game even as competition mounts, hoping to survive current struggles
so they can reap the high profits expected to emerge when the losers are eventually forced out.
Consequently, they tend to over-invest, building plants in areas with cheaper labor and/or adding
cutting-edge technology. In markets such as semiconductors and airplanes, best-practice technology
requires huge investment. Ironically, investment aimed at insuring competitive strength
simultaneously generates risk. Over-investment in a period of low profit rates and high interest
commitments requires many firms to use high leverage. While high leverage is a well-known feature
of Asia’s economies, rising leverage occurs in any system with high investment levels, falling
profits, and high interest burdens.
In neoclassical textbook models, the downward pressure on profits, capacity utilization, and
prices is soon eliminated by the exit of firms to industries with higher profits. But in the Neoliberal
regime, it is reproduced, because entry is not matched by exit. The more these pressures develop, the
more they force firms to cut wages, smash unions, move to areas of cheaper labor, and push for tax
cuts and other government policies which restrict aggregate demand—one of the major causes of the
excessive competitive pressures in the first place. The elements causing slow aggregate-demand
growth and excess aggregate supply thus reinforce one another in a vicious circle.
The pattern of excess supply leading to coercive competition in the real sector is repeated in
the financial sector. In the wake of continuing financial deregulation, removal of capital controls, and
technical change, large banks are forced to compete globally for up-scale customers.
5 Accompanying
this trend is a shift in these banks’ revenue generation from traditional intermediation (lending to
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hold) to fee-based income (lending to sell).  This shift reflects both the premium placed on liquidity
in the uncertain economic climate of the Neoliberal order, and also banks’ reluctance to absorb
default and other risks in this climate.  However, in shifting away from intermediation and toward
fee-based activities, banks are moving into heightened competition both with investment and
brokerage firms and with one another.  Increasingly, high profits can be obtained in the financial
sector only in two ways:  by opening up new lending venues and enjoying a scarcity rent on funds
lent; or  by taking on highly-leveraged excessive risks.  Events in recent months have made it clear
that the bets these players take can jeopardize the stability of the entire global financial system.
In sum, the step-by-step dismantling of Keynesian policies from the mid-1970s onward and
the freeing of capital movement have pushed the world’s economies deeper into a Neoliberal
economic trap which increasingly shuts in on itself.  As the bottom portion of Figure 1 illustrates,
Pax Americana and the fixed exchange-rate regime no longer set the tone for global economic
policy, as in the Golden Age; multinational firms and mobile capital do.  Restrictions on state action
reduce the scope for redistributive policies and hence erode mass support for lift-all-boats efforts.
This in turn eliminates Keynesian employment-based demand management and leaves states with
price stability targets, contributing to a global deflationary bias.
6  The Golden Age political
consensus in favor of Keynesian demand management, market regulation, and income redistribution
now appears to be an exercise in hopeless utopianism; replacing this consensus is a global sense of
pessimism on the part of national electorates, whose erstwhile leaders have conditioned them to
expect nothing and hope for nothing.
III.  The East Asian Model : Myths and Reality
This brings us to the East Asian model itself. The shock-waves emanating from this region's
current crisis should not cause us to forget East Asia's immense long-term achievements.  The
prototype was Japan in the 1950s “income doubling” period, while from 1961 through 1996, South
Korea’s average annual rate of growth of real per capita GDP and real wages averaged about 7% per
year. Though East and South East Asia constitute about 25% of global GDP, in the 1990s about half
of the growth of world GDP has originated in this area. Ajit Singh recently observed that: “It is no
exaggeration to say that the post-World War II development of East Asia (including Japan) is the
most successful story of sustained economic expansion in the history of mankind” (Singh, 1996).
This economic success has been achieved through a structure of state-led growth originated
in Japan, refined in the four “Tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong), and
subsequently adapted for use in South East Asia, China, and elsewhere. The beginning of wisdom
about the East Asian model is the recognition that it has differed substantially from one country to
another, and within countries from one period to another.
7 This variability has allowed analysts to
explain the elements behind East Asia’s brilliant economic performance very differently.
  Marcus
Noland has remarked in private correspondence that East Asia has been a mirror, in which many
analysts have seen the reflections of their own preconceived ideas. For example, some economists
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have attempted to attribute the success of Taiwan, and East Asian economies more generally, to their
pursuit of policies that a market-oriented economic approach would have dictated anyway--despite
voluminous evidence to the contrary (Wade, 1990).
It is thus important to be clear on the essential features of the Asian model—what this model
is and is not. A common misimpression regards the Asian model as controlled by a giant predatory
state which monopolizes national output and builds wealth by running aggressive trade surpluses,
and devalues its currency aggressively to maintain its edge in global markets. Reality is far more
complex. First, the government accounts for no larger a share of output in East Asia than elsewhere.
Further, East Asian countries do not uniformly run trade surpluses. Figure 2 shows that Korea and
Thailand have more often run trade deficits than surpluses. In the 1990s Korea has consistently had
trade deficits with both the US and Japan.  As for chronic currency devaluations, Figure 3 shows that
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, two East Asian currencies (the Japanese yen and Taiwanese dollar)
have risen substantially against the US dollar, while three others held their value against the dollar
until the 1997 crisis period.
What then are the points of commonality in the East Asian model?  First is the shared
structural circumstances and historical legacy of nations in this portion of the world. Of special
importance is the relative paucity of mineral resources and oil, which helps explain the centrality of
trade considerations in these nations’ policies. Second, and most important, is the fact of  heavy state
involvement in the allocation of resources. This has been referred to in the literature as the
developmental state (Johnson, 1995) or late industrialization (Amsden, 1989). For example, until the
recent crisis period, the Korean government provided temporary import protection for domestic
markets introducing new products or technologies, channeled the development of high tech
production capabilities to a small number of diversified companies (called chaebol), allocated credit
toward priority industries and technologies, and tightly regulated the cross border movement of
money.  At the same time, the government selectively opened markets to import competition and
imposed export performance criteria in return for government aid to insure that key industries
achieved world-class efficiency. Such heavy involvement in investment and savings flows is present
even when the apparent level of government involvement is relatively slight, as in Taiwan. Strong
government guidance is, of course, antithetical to Neoliberalism, but it did lead to high investment
levels, as Figure 4 illustrates.  The US investment share of GDP hovers just under 20%; Malaysia’
and Taiwan’s shares have trended downward to about 25%; but Japan’s share has remained at about
30%. Investment shares in Korea and Thailand have climbed over 35% in the 1990s.
The Asian economies are tightly integrated. This close relationship is demonstrated in Figure
5.  The US GDP growth rate is relatively independent of the East Asian rates, which instead vary
closely with Japan’s cyclical growth rate.  In 1996, about 52% of Asian exports, and 54% of its
imports, were intra-regional (UNCTAD, 1998, page 27). The apparent pattern of dependence on
Japan is not surprising given the sheer scale of the Japanese economy, whose GDP is about 12 times
as large as Korea’s.  That the Korean economy was, until the 1997 crisis, the eleventh largest in the
world, makes this mismatch all the more remarkable.
Another theme of East Asian development has been deferred gratification for consumers.
Tight constraints have been imposed on the domestic consumer goods market  in order to free up
resources for investment and exports. Current consumption has been sacrificed for high rates of9
capital accumulation, and thus for future consumption. The guiding idea has been that household
needs would be met by the sheer pace of growth.
8
Finally, East Asia has been understood to be reasonably free from the overt capital-labor
conflict that has often characterized Western labor markets and labor processes. The exchange of the
security of lifetime employment for worker loyalty in pursuit of company objectives is often seen as
key components of the Japanese and  Korean ‘miracles’. 
But the deferred-gratification/low-conflict features of the Asian model should not be
exaggerated or romanticized. Rapid growth, relatively flat pay scales, and flexible supervisory
methods have often kept capital-labor conflict in the background.  But political repression including
the destruction of independent, democratic and militant unions has played a crucial role as well--and
continues to do so in the restructuring processes imposed by the IMF after the crisis began.  Further,
the avoidance of overt capital-labor conflict is due in part to the heavy industrial use of female labor
in the context of long-standing gender-based oppression. But the case of Japan shows that the long-
term price of playing the gender card in industrial development is the ‘revolt’ of women, which can
jeopardize the reproduction of social relations in several ways (see Naff 1994). Further, housing
remains inadequate, especially for lower-income people (Ha, 1995; and W.J. Kim, 1997). And
democratic participation has been restricted--at times outlawed, encouraging the entrenchment of
powerful economic and political elites (E.M Kim, 1997).
9
IV. The Emergence of the East Asian Crisis: An Overview
In this section we make two arguments. First, that the fundamental structural incompatibility
between the Neoliberal regime and the East Asian model guaranteed that the Asian economic miracle
would inevitably be disrupted at some time, in some way. Second, that the financial liberalization
imposed on Asia by external and internal elites, in the context of the global financial regime, set the
stage for the timing and character--the conjunctural and contingent characteristics--of the Asian crisis
of late 1997. We see these two arguments as addressing, respectively, the ultimate and proximate
causes of the crisis.
Structural Incompatibility
It is not just a coincidence that Japan, Korea and Taiwan created and consolidated their East
Asian models during the Golden Age. Northern growth was rapid and the demand for imports grew
even faster. Since only a few Asian countries were vying for shares of Northern import markets, and
were starting from a small base, their success posed no immediate threat to host countries. Cold War
politics made the US hesitant to treat these countries too harshly; on the contrary, it provided
substantial grants and loans to assist their development. Plus, the US pumped money into Asian
countries in the course of prosecuting the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Finally, note that for much of
the period, the movement of financial capital across national borders was slow, and controlled by
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national governments.
But the rise of the Neoliberal regime has created multidimensional tensions with developing
countries that have adopted the Asian model. For one thing, East Asia's success offered proof that an
intelligent and flexible combination of state regulation and market forces could achieve a
combination of economic growth, productivity, technological progress, and income equality superior
to anything Neoliberalism could offer. Until 1997, the unparalleled success of the Asian model was
seen by many as proof that the idea embodied in the “Washington consensus” that “there is no
alternative” to Neoliberalism was just an ideological slogan, not a fact.  For another, it was true even
in the Golden Age that export-led growth in the South could never be a permanently successful
strategy for every developing country given limits to the growth of low to mid-tech global export
markets.  But the evolution of the Neoliberal regime with its chronically inadequate aggregate
demand growth and structurally determined excess supply made these limits bind earlier and bite
harder than otherwise would have been the case. Asian countries could not continue forever to
increase exports at 8% a year in a global economy whose developed economies were growing at 2%
a year. These constraints meant that sometime, somewhere, export-led developing countries were
likely to experience severe problems.
As a result of conflicts between the structure of the East Asian models and the ideological
and material interests of the G-7 nations and multilateral institutions, enormous pressure was applied
to East Asian countries in the late 1980s and 1990s to deconstruct key components of their economic
systems.  Northern powers pressed with special vigor for liberalization of both domestic and
international financial markets, and elimination of trade management and investment oversight. This
pressure arose in part because the profits that firms, banks, and rentiers outside East Asia could earn
from its economic miracle was severely restricted by Asian governments’ controls and regulations.
Beyond this, Asia’s government-directed economies represented the last significant obstacle to the
consolidation of global Neoliberalism. Western interests believed that they were in a “war” with East
Asia over what kind of capitalism would dominate the early twenty-first century--US capitalism or
East Asian capitalism; and they intended to win. Though they used many weapons in this war,
financial liberalization was clearly central to their battle plans.
Financial Liberalization, Short-Term Capital Flows, and the Outbreak of Crisis
That the sought after financial liberalization was if fact achieved is demonstrated by the surge
of capital inflows to East Asia in the 1990s. Figures 6 and 7 provide data on yearly inflows of short-
term and long-term capital in four East Asian economies. These economies all experienced a
substantial rise in short-term capital inflows in the 1990s. Long-term capital inflows rose in three of
the four countries as well.  It is important to emphasize the shift toward short-term lending, depicted
in Figure 8. The short-term character of much of this capital reflects global lenders’ perceived need
to maximize their liquidity—the ability to unwind any position quickly and with minimum loss, and
created the potential for a lightning-fast bout of capital outflow.  These short-term financial inflows
created the preconditions for Minsky crises, especially in South East Asian countries such as
Malaysia and Indonesia that lack deep financial markets, adequate regulation, and lender of last
resort institutions.
10 The inflow of so much money in such a short time to so many different East
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Asian countries created the possibility of region-wide panics, contagions, and financial crises.
Moreover, the East Asian model is an integrated and coherent whole. Its impressive successes
were the result of all key components working together. Breaking down some parts of the system
while leaving others intact courted disaster.  Opening Asia to unregulated capital inflows before
making all the other changes that financial deregulation required made no sense. In particular, the
deregulation of  domestic and international financial markets and the elimination of state investment
coordination in the context of traditional corporate and bank leverage ratios was a recipe for crisis.
Corporate debt equity ratios of three or four are inherently vulnerable to profit or interest or
exchange rate shocks.
11
The huge and variable capital inflows to Asia set up a Catch-22 dilemma for Asian exchange
rate regimes, which raised yet higher the likelihood of crisis. As Figure 3 shows, most East Asian
countries adopted de facto fixed exchange rate regimes in the 1990s. This insured foreign investors
against exchange rate losses. Fixed rates also required that national authorities control inflation and
limit budget deficits—policies favored by foreign rentiers; they thus helped generate glowing
evaluations by the IMF and World Bank as to the soundness of these economies, which only
accelerated the speed of capital inflows. However, de facto fixed exchange rates made it impossible
to eliminate current-account deficits. So when deficits did arise, governments had to use their limited
reserves to defend the exchange rate. When investors began to withdraw funds because current
account deficits threatened the exchange rate regime in 1997, governments were forced to use their
exchange reserves even faster. When the exchange rate pegs were finally abandoned in the heat of
the crisis, remaining reserves were too small to cover foreign debt repayment commitments. Default
or IMF supervision were then the only remaining options.
12
Under speculative bursts of capital inflows and outflows, however, flexible exchange rate
regimes can lead to devastating exchange rate instability. Inflows raise exchange rates, causing
current account deficits and domestic credit explosions; large outflows make it impossible for
domestic firms and banks to repay foreign denominated debt. No small, trade-dependent country can
tolerate the extreme exchange-rate volatility inherent in the Neoliberal regime.  That is why capital
controls are essential for such countries.
Thus, once Neoliberal forces had successfully orchestrated the liberalization of domestic
financial markets and international capital flows, and weakened the structures of trade management
and investment coordination, the Asian countries were placed in deep jeopardy no matter which
                                                                                                                                                                  
Asian financial crisis.
11 See Wade and Veneroso (1998). The high debt ratios of the Asian model follow logically from the
fact that profits are low, while household savings and capital investment are high. High corporate
debt levels are the inevitable result of using a banking system to transfer large volumes of household
savings to the corporate sector to finance investment.
12 The Wall Street Journal of October 16, 1998 makes the same argument about the untenability
(hence Catch-22 aspect) of both fixed and flexible exchange rates, nothing that “misalignments and
currency crashes are equally likely under pegged and flexible exchange rate regimes. In the 116
instances between 1976 and 1996 when currencies plunged 25% or more, half were operating with
flexible exchange rate systems” (while obviously the other half were fixed or pegged).12
exchange rate regime they adopted. It was only a matter of time until crisis came.
We will flesh out the dynamics of the Asian crisis and present a more detailed explanation of
its causes, with special focus on the case of Korea, in section VI. But first, we look at the strengths
and weaknesses of the explanations of the crisis offered by mainstream economists.
V. A Critical Evaluation of Neoclassical Theories of the Asian Economic Crisis
Most analyses of the Asian crisis have focused on the cycle of short-term capital flows into
and out of the recently liberalized Asian financial markets. Outstanding treatments of theory and
facts surrounding this financial cycle can be found in the work of non-mainstream scholars such as
Wade (1998), Wade and Veneroso (1998), Akyuz (1998), Chang, Park and Yoon (1998), Grabel
(1998), MacLean, Bowles and Croci (1998), and UNCTAD (1998). Of course, many mainstream
economists have also presented theories to explain the Asian financial crisis. Before we present a
more detailed view of the crisis via an analysis of the course of events in Korea, it will be useful to
briefly review the debate within mainstream economics about the causes of Asian crisis. We preface
this review by recalling a typology developed by Radelet and Sachs (1998). These authors argue that
financial crises can have any of five causes: deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals; moral
hazard in loan markets; financial panic; asset bubbles; and disorderly workouts. Most economists’
writings on the Asian financial crisis incorporate some combination of these elements; indeed, the
debate is shaped along these lines. The IMF, for example, emphasizes the first two factors: they trace
foreign-exchange and asset-market pressure to either inappropriate macroeconomic policies or
flawed systems of financial intermediation and regulation. This coincidence is not surprising in that
the list encompasses the research interests of most economists using the core conceptual categories
of mainstream macroeconomics.  In order, these five causes correspond to: models of efficient
markets; asymmetric information models; models with multiple equilibria, especially the Diamond-
Dybvig model of bank runs; models of sunspot equilibria and self-fulfilling prophesies; and
“political economy” models with rent-seeking government officials.
There is something here for almost every Neoclassical economist. Indeed, there is something
exhilarating, almost titillating for economists about the Asian crisis; for the opinions of a sizable
band of economists revered in academia—Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Krugman, Lawrence
Summers, Martin Feldstein, Stanley Fischer, and so on—have been analyzed in excruciating detail in
leading journals of world opinion. Political professionals like to say about careers in their field that
“you find a horse and you ride him.” Things are little different for economists interested in making
their mark on Noriel Rubini’s instantly famous Asian crisis homepage—you find a theoretical take
and you ride it.
13
                                                
13 The most extreme example of this is perhaps the empirical sub-literature on whether banking and
financial collapses (like those in Asia) have generally been foreshadowed by deteriorating
macroeconomic or structural fundamentals. The one-time character of any given occurrence of
financial crisis leaves too few degrees of freedom for a reliable test. Some enterprising economists
have tried to overcome this constraint by building up a panel of different occurrences of banking and
financial crisis in contemporary economic experience; by stretching the definition of crisis and the
allowable range of countries, they are able to generate 50 or more events. This in turn makes it
possible to use a multinomial probit model to test whether a number of macroeconomic and financial13
The fundamental problem with most of this literature is, not surprisingly, the problem one
finds in mainstream macroeconomics debates between New Keynesians and New Classicals (and the
shades in-between):  this debate is conducted using as a point of reference the perfectly coordinated,
mistake-free Walrasian general equilibrium model. There is certainly nothing wrong with comparing
outcomes in one’s model of choice with the Walrasian case. The problem goes deeper, however, to
an ingrained habit of contemporary debate in mainstream theory: the idea that the implications of a
given idea can be understood—and thus accepted as important—only with respect to the deviations
they introduce from Walrasian equilibrium. Models for which the Walrasian case is simply not
applicable thus cannot be understood.
The debate over the Asian model has quickly taken on this sort of flavor: the focus is on the
mechanism that drives one away from the efficient equilibrium assumed to be the natural resting
place of the system. A good example of this approach is a recent paper by Chang and Velasco
(1998). These authors adapt the Diamond-Dybvig model (1983) to show that a shortage of global
liquidity combined with a shock that adversely affects borrower countries in the presence of short-
term capital inflows can generate recessions driven in part by a debt-deflation multiplier. Clearly,
these authors have generated a framework capturing many aspects of recent events in a clever and
concise way.
The question is, where does an analysis of this sort go next?  One move would be to attempt
to add in additional realistic features based on stylized characteristics of Asian economies with
respect to the labor process, the government sector, a household sector, and so on. But this is asking
the Diamond-Dybvig framework to carry a lot more weight than it was designed to bear, given its
origin as a simple demonstration of the possibility of bank runs. Not only would such realistic
features conflict with the simplifying assumptions required to generate a closed-form equilibrium;
but adding them would lead to confusion on the part of mainstream economists as to which realistic
feature is generating what amount of inefficiency in the resulting second-best equilibrium. To pertain
more fully to the unfolding crisis in Asia, this (and other) framework(s) must be stretched this way;
but to do so takes them quickly beyond the formal limits that generated their explanatory force in the
first place. The problem derives, at root, from theoretical economists’ insistence on assuming that the
Walrasian maintained hypothesis is meaningful—that in the absence of whatever mechanism is
emphasized, the economy would be at (or near) an efficient economic outcome. It is possible to ask,
“what else is missing?” only within the straitjacket imposed by whatever formalism underlies an
author’s results. To insist on bringing in factors that require loosening that straitjacket invites the
suggestion that one doesn’t understand the rules of this game.
                                                                                                                                                                  
variables collected for these various events are useful indicators of banking crises.  For example,
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) build a model of this sort, then apply the parameters they obtain to
the case of East Asia. They find that variables capturing the vulnerability of the banking and
corporate sector predict the subsequent crises, but macroeconomic variables do not. One problem
with this exercise is that it requires the assumption that, say, the US savings and loan crisis of the
1980s, the Japanese banking crisis of the early 1990s, and numerous bank runs in smaller countries
around the globe in the past 20 years can be put into a uniform data set and manipulated using
models that require a high degree of statistical regularity.14
Another problem is empirical. One would like to move toward an empirical implementation
of an idea like Chang and Velasco’s.  However, the formal restrictions required to generate
equilibrium in their model do not permit the construction of a set of empirical propositions. A
reduced form must be used, one that presumably includes the list of variables that could shift the
parameters of central interest in this formulation. However, this reduced form will be almost
indistinguishable from those generated by models based on very different premises—in this
particular case, from the Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) model discussed in footnote 13, which
assumes efficient markets (and does not bother with the information asymmetry at the root of the
Chang/Velasco framework). Suppose one found that variables representing structural features of the
banking system, as Hardy and Pazarbasioglu do, matter empirically?  It is unclear whether one is
showing:  á la Chang and Velasco, that the banking system has malfunctioned because of
international liquidity shortages: á la Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, that lack of regulatory oversight and
other structural problems in domestic banking systems are to blame; or something else altogether.
Still, the sheer difficulty of getting significant coefficients with small time-series/cross-section
samples poses a barrier, even if one swallows the objections raised in footnote 1.
We can sum up this discussion by generalizing a remark that Jeffrey Sachs made about IMF
economists in his Financial Times article of December 13, 1997, “it defies logic to believe that the
small group of 1,000 economists on 19
th Street in Washington”—or for that matter a self-conscious
academic elite not afraid to substitute a simplifying assumption for an institutional investigation—
“should dictate the economic conditions of life to 75 developing countries with around 1.4 billion
people”—or that their own debating conventions should dictate the terms on which matters of such
importance must be understood.
Following every nuance of the burgeoning economic literature would be exhausting, if not
impossible, in the manner of a cat chasing its own tail. The remainder of this section identifies the
three central threads along which debate has flowed.
The Asian Model on Trial: The Neoliberal/Neoclassical Perspective
The Neoliberal view of the Asian crisis is espoused by economists at the IMF and World
Bank, by business economists, and by conservative, largely US-trained academic economists,
including many in elite universities in Asia and Latin America. Neoliberal economic theory is the
official ideology of the Neoliberal regime. This view finds the roots of the Asian crisis in the
inherent incompatibility of the external (Neoliberal) global environment and most Asian nations’
internal economic structures and policies.  This incompatibility is traced in part to self-dealing and
rent-seeking, “crony capitalism,” which the March 1998 issue of Finance and Development sees,
inter alia, as the root of the crisis in Southeast Asia (see Grey and Kaufman, 1998).  In countries
where corruption is not present, the IMF position is that something must be wrong with either
macroeconomic management or institutions.  Since Asia’s afflicted economies generally had strong
macroeconomic fundamentals prior to the crisis, blame focuses on “weaknesses in financial systems
and, to a lesser extent, governance.” (IMF, 1998).
14
                                                
14 This argument trips over itself. The governments in crisis are blamed both for permitting
weaknesses to emerge in financial systems (through the aforementioned over-regulation of flows)
and for their inadequate financial supervision. The contradiction herein is resolved if one considers15
This approach asserts that market fundamentals should drive observed outcomes, and
government intervention can only worsen outcomes. Since only the Neoliberal approach fully
embodies this view, "there is no alternative" to Neoliberalism.  No East Asian model of centralized
control over capital movements and investment can be permanently sustained because its costs--price
distortions, misallocated resources and restricted access to Northern goods and financial instruments-
-will eventually become too large to bear. The crisis is thus not attributable to external forces such as
currency speculation, but to the cumulation of internal inefficiencies. Any transition from
government-controlled allocation to decentralized market allocation will, it is admitted, impose
temporary costs of adjustment, but in the Neoliberal view, the permanent costs of not opening capital
and product markets clearly exceed the one-time costs of transition.
The Asian Model on Trial: Economic Theory Weighs In
Broadly speaking, contemporary theoretical models can be divided into those with unique
and those with multiple equilibria. The unique-equilibrium models invariably describe efficient
outcomes along steady-state growth paths; the multiple-equilibrium models permit deviations from
efficient outcomes for reasons ranging from missing information, to perverse parameters, to
asymmetric information, and so on. Models of the second type, which as already mentioned
encompass almost the entire research agenda of applied microeconomists and macroeconomists
using mainstream methods, are being widely and variously applied to the Asian crisis. The apparent
facts of the case fit well with the notion of a good equilibrium which is replaced by a bad one.
Models of this type have been used to identify problems in Asia. For ease, we consider just
one strand within this stream--microfoundational models in which bubbles emerge due to incentive
problems under asymmetric information. The fundamental problem is incentive incompatibility
between a well-informed loan applicant and a less-informed lender: in finite-horizon games in which
loan applicants pay interest and keep residual returns, applicants have an incentive to undertake
riskier projects than lenders want to underwrite. The potential for overlending and/or a bubble then
arises if lenders do not exercise adequate vigilance. Banking systems in which risks are guaranteed
are especially likely to fall prey to this sort of moral hazard problem. This general approach has been
used to indict deposit insurance as the culprit in the 1980s US savings and loan crisis and the Latin
American debt crisis.
15 
Paul Krugman’s web-published January 1998 paper proposes a moral-hazard theory of the
East and Southeast Asian financial crisis incorporating these elements. Specifically, he argues that
                                                                                                                                                                  
that it refers to financial systems already in transition from government-directed to market-based
methods of allocation. Interestingly, a paper produced independently by economists at the IMF
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998) summarizes some empirical tests which conclude that
financial liberalization increases the probability of banking crisis.
15 The standard asymmetric-information models of the LDC debt crisis are Sachs (1984) and Eaton,
Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986). These models advance the proposition that the debt crisis arose
because the penalty for non-payment was too low and contractual terms could not be enforced. The
recurrence of two currently prominent names from this earlier discussion gives pause. As Yogi Berra
put it, “It’s deja vu all over again.”16
each nation has a class of assets–especially land–that is fixed in quantity but has a variable return.
Suppose the return to land can be either high or low with a given probability. Then under risk
neutrality a fair price for this land is, (Probability of high return) x (Value of high return) +
(Probability of low return) x (Value of low return). Krugman argues that a bubble in land values
emerges when one set of bidders on these assets discards the low return, and thus bids their price up
to the high-return value. The culprit is the domestic banking system, which supports this bidding-up
because it is backed by implicit governmental guarantees against failure. The asset bubble then
bursts when low returns occur, generating losses for banks that governments are unable to absorb.
This sets off a contagion effect when depositors at banks holding overvalued assets of this sort
realize that they stand to lose the next time a low-return outcome is drawn.
16
Second Thoughts about the Neoliberal Regime: Economic Theory Changes its Mind
But what economic theory gives, it also takes away.  The same asymmetric-information
framework used by Krugman to demonstrate weak points in the Asian model has been deployed to
defend it and cast suspicion back on the Neoliberal regime itself as the possible culprit. This counter-
offensive draws strength from the fact that neither of the aforementioned attacks on the Asian model
fits the facts very comfortably. Vis-à-vis the IMF’s two-level attack, note that some countries
affected in the current crisis have succeeded because of state-directed, interventionist
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies, not despite them. Further, the spread of the Asian crisis
to Latin America has hit hardest countries such as Brazil and Mexico that have made sustained
efforts to rebuild their economies after the debt-crisis years using precisely the orthodox policies
championed by the IMF. If the IMF was right, Latin America should have stayed clear of the Asian
meltdown of 1997-98. Further, while Krugman’s asset-bubble argument may apply to some features
of recent Southeast Asian experience, it doesn’t fit the situation of Korea at all, not to mention Latin
America. As Dymski (1998b) observes, Korea’s land and stock market bubble peaked nearly a
decade ago; a variety of policy steps had reined in the worst excesses of that bubble before this crisis
broke out.
This general line of attack is set out in a March 12 speech in Manila by Joseph Stiglitz, now
Chief Economist at the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1998).  According to Stiglitz, “Curiously many of the
factors identified as contributors to East Asian economies’ current problems are strikingly similar to
the explanations previously put forward for their success.” Here Stiglitz is referring to core results
from applications of the asymmetric-information framework to the developing-country case, a
method he pioneered.
17 Stiglitz argues that because asymmetric information and incentive
                                                
16 A macroeconomic approach building on the same factors as Krugman’s microfoundational model
is McKinnon’s “overborrowing syndrome” model, which focuses on the inadequate regulation of
domestic banks with access to overseas financial borrowing. This approach was operationalized
empirically by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), a contribution which has now provided a launching
point for many applied papers on the Asian crisis.
17For example, Stiglitz and Uy argue that, “Several characteristics of financial sector interventions in
East Asia stand out: they incorporated design features that improved the chances of success and
reduced opportunities for abuse; interventions that did not work out were dropped unhesitatingly;
and policies were adapted to reflect changing economic conditions.” (Stiglitz and Uy, 1996: 249)
They go on to argue, in opposition to Krugman’s emphasis on moral hazard and government17
incompatibility are fundamental features of unregulated credit markets, those markets are prone to
market failure. East Asia has defended against market failure in several ways--government
coordination of resource flows, limited scope for interest-rate movements, and close instead of arms-
length relationships between borrowers and lenders. The success of these measures contributed to the
rapid development of these economies.  Indeed, he points out that the East Asian solution to credit-
market failure permitted Asian governments to channel a remarkably high proportion of national
output as savings into capital accumulation without chronic market instability. Stiglitz admits that
there was some misallocation of credit in East Asia. But macroeconomic fundamentals there were
strong, and these credit-misallocation problems do not prove that these systems are fundamentally
flawed. Instead “the buildup of short-term, unhedged debt left East Asia’s economies vulnerable to a
sudden collapse of confidence.” Thus, he concludes, it was financial deregulation followed by
excessive short-term capital inflows, not corruption or credit misallocation attributable to
government guarantees or regulatory laxity, that plunged East Asia into crisis.
Clearly, then, mainstream theories of the Asian crisis are inherently incapable of explaining
either the successes or the failure of the Asian model. They are thus an inadequate foundation on
which to build policies for reconstructing prosperity in Asia and the rest of the world.
VI. The Triple Crisis: Korea, Asia and the Neoliberal regime
We focus our analysis of the Asian crisis in this section on events in South Korea.  Highly
diversified, family-owned conglomerates, called chaebol, dominate Korea’s key export markets as
well a many of its essential domestic markets. The chaebol were the vehicles used by governments
over the past decades to build Korea’s technological, productivity and growth ‘miracle’.  Indeed, one
might say that the Korean ‘model’ consisted of state regulation of the creation and evolution of the
chaebol, largely, though not exclusively,  through its control of credit flows.
In the 1990s many of the chaebol’s key export markets--including semiconductor, autos, ship
building, steel, petrochemicals, construction, capital goods, and electronic equipment--suffered from
the chronic excess supply and secular deflationary pressure discussed above. They thus faced fierce
competition in their struggle to maintain and increase market share. At the same time, Korea’s long-
period of tight labor markets, in concert with key political changes after the ‘revolution’ of 1987,
strengthened the labor movement, building steady upward pressure on the growth of real wages.
Caught between rising labor costs and downward price pressure in product markets, the chaebol
sought relief through high rates of productivity growth in their domestic operations, and the
movement of many of their lower tech operations into the cheap labor pools of South East Asia, just
as Japan had done earlier. Both objectives required high rates of capital investment in the face of the
low profit rates coercive competitors brought to these industries.
Meanwhile, a global pool of liquid financial capital ready to cross borders in pursuit of high
short-term profits had risen to gargantuan proportions through the expansion of Neoliberalism--by
                                                                                                                                                                  
intervention in financial crises, that: “financial crises occur with remarkable frequency in the absence
of government intervention. Private monitoring apparently does not suffice to prevent a financial
crisis. Moreover, no single financial institution will exercise sufficient care on its own to avoid
financial distress.”18
1997 about $1.5 trillion moved through the foreign exchange markets every day. Partly in response
to the dearth of high returns available in Northern markets in the early 1990s, an increasing
proportion of hot money began to move in the direction of Asia. Heated competition developed
among global bankers and investment fund managers to get the best opportunities that East Asia,
South East Asia and China had to offer. Loan “pushing” became the order of the day, just as it had
been in the Latin American debt buildup of the 1970s. By 1996 over $300 billion a year of foreign
capital was flowing into developing economies; over $90 billion of these funds went to the five
Asian nations that were to be hardest hit by the 1997 crisis.
Of course, Korean markets would not have been open to the inflow of hot money if the
traditional tight control of capital flows into and out of the country we associate with the East Asian
model had been kept intact. But powerful global agents such as the G7, the OECD, the IMF, the
World Bank, and multinational banks and firms had exerted enormous economic and political
pressure on Korea and other Asian countries to deregulate domestic financial markets and capital
flows, and to reduce barriers to imports and FDI. Those who resisted this pressure were threatened
with restricted access to Northern goods and financial markets and hostile treatment from
international agencies. Especially in the 1990s, after the Cold War ended, external Neoliberal agents
bullied the countries of the South without restraint.
Meanwhile, many of the East Asian banks, industrial and commercial firms, and elite
families that had prospered and grown powerful as a result of the decades-long “miracle” came to
believe that their future economic interests were tied more closely to developments in global than in
domestic markets. They came to believe that their personal prosperity was less dependent on national
well being than on unrestricted access to foreign markets. They knew that such access would not be
forthcoming unless their own governments gave in to external pressures to liberalize domestic
markets. These agents created a rising internal demand for liberalization that reinforced the external
pressures faced by area governments.
In Korea, the internal pressure for liberalization came primary from the families that owned
the chaebol. As noted, the chaebol felt they had no choice but to increase investment spending to
survive the coercive competition they faced in their primary export markets. But their motives for
undertaking this investment expansion were not simple or uni-dimensional. The long history of
success they had achieved in gaining a foothold in increasingly important global markets led chaebol
leaders to believe that they could become even bigger global players. Sometime in the early 1990s
the chaebol developed excessively and unrealistically ambitious plans to become serious competitors
to the most powerful Northern multinational corporations, contesting markets with them all over the
globe through exports as well as foreign direct investment. The rise in the value of the yen after
1993, which the chaebol believed reflected a long-term trend, may have contributed to their
ambitions. Thus, both pressure to survive and ambition to become more powerful--defensive and
offensive motivations--combined to induce the chaebol to undertake huge investments in new
capacity and in new technology at home and abroad.
Though the chaebols' gross profit rates were modest, contrary to popular belief, they were not
much out of line with their foreign competitors (see Chang 1998, Table 2). However, their high
debt/equity ratios generated oppressive interest burdens, which forced net profit rates well below
average. As a result, the chaebol needed a great deal of new credit to finance this new investment.19
Toward this end, they allied themselves with external Neoliberal forces to pressure the government
to accelerate the pace of domestic financial market deregulation. In response, the government of Kim
Young Sam permitted the establishment of 9 new merchant banks in 1994 and 15 more in 1996,
most of them started by people who had made their fortunes in the informal curb market and had
little or no experience in standard commercial banking. According to sources in the banking industry,
the government exercised little regulation or control over these banks. They even failed to monitor
them. The government apparatus had no idea what these banks were doing with either their asset
commitments or liability structures. This total lack of banking oversight constituted a dramatic break
with traditional East Asian practices. The chaebol took significant ownership positions in many of
the new merchant banks, and borrowed extensively from them; most of this debt was short term.
Thus, the chaebol became even more indebted to domestic institutions than was usual in the high
debt-to-equity tradition of the Korean and Japanese models.
The chaebol and the new merchant banks also wanted unlimited access to foreign credit
markets, in part because global interest rates were as much as 50% lower than those available in the
still semi-regulated Korean market.
18 They therefore pressured the government to prematurely and
excessively liberalize short-term inward capital flows--bank loans and portfolio capital.
Liberalization of the capital account was also a requirement for membership in the OECD, which the
chaebol sought in order to guarantee themselves access without discrimination to Northern goods
and investment markets (Amsden and Eun, 1997). But the Korean government, under strong pressure
from the chaebol, liberalized capital flows even faster than was required by the agreement with the
OECD.
Thus, as a number of heterodox economists cited in Section V have noted, the preconditions
for the outbreak of the crisis were created not by too much government interference in the private
sector, or too much ‘cronyism, but by the failure of the government to maintain its traditional
responsibility to monitor and control economic activity in the national interest. We would argue,
however, that one cannot fully understand why this excessive liberalization took place without an
evaluation of the internal contradictions and tensions within Korea. External Neoliberal forces may
be the main villains in this sad story, but they are not the only villains.
Thus, just when global financial markets were flush with money seeking to move into the
new ‘hot’ markets of Asia, some Asian governments were tearing down the barriers that had
previously prevented their free entry.
19 Fed by the ongoing euphoria associated with the East Asian
boom, global investors exhibited their usual herd-behavior. Short-term foreign funds poured into
Korea in 1994 through 1996, mostly in the form of bank loans. Some of the loans were directly to the
chaebol, most were made to Korean banks, which relent much of the money to the chaebol. It is
believed that the merchant banks used a significant part of their foreign borrowings to speculate in
financial assets around Asia.
                                                
18The difference between US and, especially, Japanese interest rates led to a wave of so-called “carry
trades” in which multinational banks would borrow in Japan or the US at low rates, then relend the
money to Korean firms or banks at rates that were high enough to create attractive margins, yet were
still well below domestic rates in Korea.
19 Of course, those governments that chose not to liberalize rapidly, such as Taiwan and China,
stayed relatively insulated from the immediate effects of the subsequent financial crisis.20
The result of the liberalization of short-term capital inflows in these circumstances was a
doubling of foreign bank debt between 1994 and 1997 from about $60 B to about $120 B (not
counting the debts of foreign branches of Korean banks). Total foreign debt was still not grossly out
of line with the experience of other countries; the key problem was that over 60% of this debt was
short-term, due within one year.
The chaebol had thus financed an ambitious and risky long-term capital investment boom
primarily with short-term loans, a large part of which were owed to foreign lenders and therefore due
in foreign currency. And the government, which had traditional regulated and restrained the chaebol
in the nation’s interest, helped them do it.
It was not so much the expansion program itself that was the main source of danger, though it
was risky and probably excessively ambitious. After all, in response to the same competitive
pressures confronting the chaebol, major Northern MNCs were engaged in similar programs of
capacity expansion across the globe in industries such as autos, steel and semiconductors, all of 
which were plagued by excess capacity. This is an era in which huge oligopolies are engaged in a
competitive struggle to determine who will dominate global markets. The big question is: which
firms will be left standing when the excess capacity created in this struggle is destroyed by deep
recession, mass insolvency and bankruptcy. General Motors was expanding more or less in the same
way as the Korean chaebol. The key difference in the Korean case was in the short-term and foreign
mode of finance of the investment boom.
Despite the fact that both the IMF and the World Bank certified that the Korean economy was
in sound condition in mid 1997, the stage was now  set for the generation of a domestic and external
financial crisis. Any one of a large number of not-unlikely developments would now trigger both
kinds of financial crises: a devaluation of the won (which would require more won to pay back a
given debt in dollars or yen), an under-valuation of the yen (which could erode export markets),
increasing foreign interest rates, a domestic recession, a slowing of growth in key export markets, or
any other source of profit problems for the chaebol.
Under such conditions, domestic financial turmoil could quickly induce a foreign exchange
crisis, while any problem in external markets would tip the razor’s edge balance of the domestic
economy. Foreign banks that begin to fear defaults on their short-term loans and portfolio investors
that suspect a currency devaluation both know that the first banks and the first investors to withdraw
their funds from the country will be the least likely to suffer. If the chaebol had trouble servicing
their domestic loans, foreign banks and portfolio investors were likely to pull their money out of
Korea. The situation was thus ripe for a panic or contagion, which would accelerate the collapse in
the currency, raising the likelihood of the mass defaults that everyone feared. That the Korean
government maintained an inadequate volume of foreign reserves, an amount perhaps equal to three
months of imports, made the situation even more precarious.
Of course, events in the mid 1990s did build toward a crisis. Devaluation of the Chinese yuan
in 1994 and the Japanese yen in after 1995, along with falling demand in key export markets such as
steel, autos, and, especially, semiconductors, led to a rising current account deficit after 1994. In
1995 it rose slightly, to about 2% of GDP, but the deficit hit $24 B or near 5% of GDP in 1996. The21
government in the past had usually been quick to devalue the won in the face of deterioration in the
current account, but despite evidence that the won was perhaps 10% overvalued in 1995 and 1996,
several factors blocked such action. For one thing, the huge inflow of foreign capital in this period
maintained upward pressure on the won that could not be easily offset through sterilization. Further,
foreign investors had come to expect and to count on relative exchange rate stability in Asia; a sharp
devaluation might spook them. Finally, the government feared that a falling exchange rate would
make it harder for Korean firms and banks to pay back their rising foreign debt.
Korea’s current account problems did not last long; the country moved back toward balance
by mid 1997. Unfortunately, they lasted just long enough, given the other developments of the
period, to help tip the country into crisis. Declining export growth led to declining profits and
increasing excess capacity for the now highly-leveraged chaebol. This resulted in some key loan
defaults and an increase in domestic nonperforming bank loans in the first half of 1997. Whether
Korea would have been able to weather this disturbance in the absence of further problems will
never be known, because in July 1997 the sharp devaluation of the previously fixed-rate Thai bhat
triggered an outbreak of financial panic across Asia. But we do know this: if Korea’s mid 1997 debt
problems had been exclusively domestic, the economic collapse that began later that year and
accelerated after the imposition of the IMF agreement in December would not have occurred. Korea
would have suffered slower growth and financial difficulties to be sure, but not a depression and loss
of economic sovereignty.
When the Asian crisis erupted there was a general flight of investor capital from Asian
markets and Asian currencies. Foreign banks now refused to roll the loans over. Real and financial
asset prices plummeted around the region, and exchange rates went into free-fall. After losing
reserves in a futile attempt to support exchange rates, countries raised interest rates to try to stop the
panic. The initial declines in asset prices in turn induced further “forced” asset sales by investors
unable to meet their interest payments.
The destructive Neoliberal financial infrastructure within which Asia was now embedded
meant that the onset of financial crisis in any country in the area would pull everyone down, the
strong as well as the weak. The won lost about 20% of its value in the period before early December,
when the IMF made its deal with Korea. Firms and banks with large dollar or yen debt were pushed
toward bankruptcy and their desperate demand for dollars and yen kept downward pressure on the
won. Interest rates rose again in response to a sharp upward re-evaluation of risk, while banks pushed
near default began to refuse to extend credit to smaller businesses. Economic growth slowed and
unemployment, almost unknown in post war Korea, rose--from 2% in November to almost 3% in
December. A self-reinforcing cycle of declining growth, falling profits, rising unemployment, rising
interest rates, falling interest coverage ratios, and rising bankruptcies was now well under way.
As the world watched in amazement and fear, a number of Asian countries turned from
economic miracles to economic disasters in a matter of weeks!  The New York Times pointed to “the
transformation of South Korea from industrial giant to industrial pauper” (11/22/97). Neoliberal
economists, who previously insisted that the success of the East Asian miracles had been generated
by free-market policies, not state-led industrial policy, now claimed that the crisis was caused by the
same powerful but inefficient state industrial policies whose existence they had previously denied.
With many of its banks and corporations unable to meet the mounting interest and principal22
repayment demands of foreign bankers, and thus on the verge of private sector foreign loan defaults
on a mass scale, the Korean government, after initial resistance, accepted in December a virtual
takeover of their economy by the US controlled IMF.
Pouring Fuel on the Fire: The agreement between Korea and the US-IMF
We have argued that the evolution of the global Neoliberal regime made the eruption of a
financial crisis in Asia at some time virtually inevitable. But the main agents of the Neoliberal
regime did not intentionally create the Asian crisis. The crisis was the unintended outcome of its
laws of motion, not the conscious objective of some international conspiracy. However, an
examination of the core elements of the IMF agreement will make clear that the forces of the
Neoliberal regime did consciously use the opportunity presented by the crisis to try to permanently
defeat the Asian alternative to Anglo-American capitalism and open Asia to the fullest exploitation
by external economic interests. Paradoxically, the consequences of the victory of the Neoliberal
regime over Asian-style capitalism have fueled a global firestorm that is likely to scorch the
Neoliberal regime itself as well as its constituent elites before it dies out.
The IMF agreements in Asia mandated institutional and policy changes which are
unprecedented in their breadth and severity.  The key elements of the IMF agreement with Korea
were as follows:
•   Austerity macroeconomic policies, including high interest rates and restrictive budget or
fiscal policy;
•   Independence of the Korean Central Bank from the rest of the government;
•   Stringent banking regulations, requiring Korean banks to take immediate steps to meet the
minimum capital/asset ratios specified in the 1986 Basle Accord;
•   Labor law reforms allowing firms operating in Korea to fire workers at will;
•   The removal of restrictions on imports, including Korea’s virtual prohibition of the
importation of Japanese autos;
•   The removal of  restrictions of foreign ownership of Korean banks and firms;
•   The elimination of all forms of government influence over both domestic and international
capital flows--including short-term capital inflows, which had triggered the immediate crisis.
The imposition of sky-high interest rates (including short rates as high as 30% at the
beginning in December and January), restrictive fiscal policy, and tough new banking standards
devastated output, employment and financial resiliency. Korean banks have always operated with
lower equity/asset ratios (higher debt/equity ratios) than are permitted by the free-market oriented
Basle standards.  When the loan defaults of the crisis left them near insolvency, the imposition of the
Basle standards forced banks to drastically cut loans, especially to small and medium size businesses.
 The resulting credit crunch then forced more firms into loan default, leaving banks even further
away from compliance with the Basle standards. Together these policies created an ever-23
deteriorating cycle of bankruptcies, bank failures, declining production and rising unemployment.
The vastly understated official unemployment rate has approached 8%, the highest rate in decades,
and may climb above 10%--this in a country without a social safety net.
While devastating to the Korean economy, this wave of destruction created advantages for
external forces and, to some extent, the chaebol.  The collapse of the Korean economy has led to a
large current account surplus--perhaps $35 billion in 1998, gained solely through a massive collapse
of imports. This surplus will provide the dollars needed to repay foreign banks and the IMF. And the
depressed stock market and undervalued won associated with the crisis make it possible for
foreigners to buy Korean firms and banks at rock bottom prices.  Labor law "reform," in turn, has
already severely weakened the Korean labor movement, and in so doing, has begun to create the
labor market “flexibility” demanded both by the chaebol and by foreign multinationals wishing to
buy Korean firms.
20 The independent Bank of Korea, as expected, has pursued the objectives of
domestic and foreign rentiers rather than those of the Korean people. It maintained high interest rates
right through mid-summer, even as the credit crunch worsened and the economy collapsed. And, of
course, some of the IMF dollars that came with the agreement were recycled to foreign lenders, thus
avoiding at least temporarily a severe crisis of the global banking system.
The last three elements of the agreement open the Korean economy to unrestricted foreign
exploitation. The US had been trying for decades to penetrate the Korean economy with only
moderate success: it looks like the IMF will finally get the job done.  Note that at present, about 99%
of cars purchased in Korea are made by Korean firms. This will change dramatically when Toyota
and Honda have unrestricted access to the market next year.
Taken together, the full implementation of these provisions would dismantle the structures
and policy tools used by successive Korean governments to regulate business in the national interest-
-and hence to create the Korean economic “miracle”.  For example, these conditions eliminate the
government's ability to allocate domestic credit flows and regulate cross-border capital flows--the
cornerstone of the Korean development model. If these agreements are permanently implemented,
Korea will lack the tools needed to reconstruct a non-Neoliberal, East Asian style system. Korea will
then end up Neoliberalized--like Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil before it.
21 Elite families and some
powerful banks and firms may prosper; but the labor movement will deteriorate and two-thirds of the
Korean population will face persistent economic insecurity and falling wages.
Internal and External Elites in Come Together in Asia: Why the Korea Government Accepted
                                                
20The struggle in Korea in the aftermath of the IMF agreements is described in Crotty and Dymski,
1998a, 1998b, and 1998c. These articles pay particular attention to the attempt by the Korean
Confederation of Trade Unions, the more independent, democratic and militant of the two major
Korean union federations, to prevent the implementation of radical Neoliberal restructuring in Korea.
21Interestingly, in June 1998, when it had become clear that the economic collapse per se was not
leading to a spontaneous economic restructuring of the sort the Neoliberals had in mind, the
government stepped in and took direct administrative control of the restructuring process. We thus
see once again that the Neoliberal commitment to free markets and disapproval of government
interference in economic activity apparently evaporates when the interests of its constituent agents
are not being well served by market processes alone.24
the IMF Agreement
 Most Koreans believe that the government had no choice but to accept whatever demands
the US and IMF made, no matter how harmful to Korea’s sovereignty and its economic future,
because the costs of debt default or even a temporary debt moratorium would have been more
catastrophic.
But it is quite likely that Korea could have held out for a less destructive agreement. To
succeed at this, the government would have had to make a credible threat to proceed without an
agreement if IMF and US demands became excessively destructive.  For example, the government
could have threatened to let Korean banks and firms default on their foreign bank loans. 
Alternatively, the government could have imposed a temporary moratorium on principal repayments
(such as the one later imposed by Russia).  The crucial point is that Korea did not need a “good”
fallback position in order to credibly threaten to reject the devastating agreement offered by the IMF.
In a bargaining situation, a threat whose enactment would severely damage its maker can be effective
if it is sufficiently dangerous to the other participants as well.  Prospective large-scale Korean
defaults did pose a severe threat to other parties directly and indirectly involved in the negotiations. 
The risk was not just to Japanese, European and American banks:  the international financial system
itself could have been thrown into crisis if investors lost confidence in the IMF's ability to organize
and lead an all-powerful global creditors' cartel.  In sum, it would have been irrational for the IMF to
refuse to aid Korea and risk a global financial crisis just because the government would accept some,
but not all of its demands.  The costs of a collapse of negotiations to the IMF and its backers would
have exceeded the benefits from holding out for the disputed demands. 
Why then did the government accept this remarkably onerous agreement? Answering this
question again takes us back to the evolution of the Neoliberal regime. By the 1990s, internal and
external elites had, to a significant degree, adopted similar beliefs concerning economic policies and
structures. Powerful internal forces in Korea wanted much of the IMF deal for their own interests.
Discussions we held in March with representatives of the chaebol and with government
officials established, to our surprise, that the chaebol were generally positive about the IMF
agreement--though they were not at all happy with its imperious mode of its design and
implementation.  While they objected to some elements of the agreement, especially the dangerously
high interest rates and the opening of the Korean economy to unrestricted Japanese imports, they
believed the IMF deal would help them accomplish two key domestic economic and political
objectives. First, the agreement would permanently undermine the power of the labor movement,
paving the way for falling wages, labor market flexibility, and permanent job insecurity.  Second, the
agreement would give the chaebol complete independence from government regulation. If fully
implemented, the agreement would create freedom for the chaebol to  pursue company profits and
owning-family financial interests inside Korea or around the globe, no matter what effect their
decisions might have on the majority of the Korean people.  So with the most powerful force in
Korea now ready to substantially align itself with IMF objectives, a credible government threat of
default or debt moratorium failed to emerge.
An analysis of the Korean side of the negotiations leading to the IMF agreement reinforces a
key point made earlier. The evolution of the Neoliberal regime helped create economic and political25
elites in Asia that eventually saw their material interests as being aligned more closely with external
Neoliberal agents than with the workers and citizens of their own countries. They became a domestic
fifth column, working to destroy the foundations of the traditional Asian models from within.
The Asian IMF Agreements and the Future of the Neoliberal Regime
The IMF agreements in Asia were clearly understood in the West to signal the final defeat of
Asian-style capitalism in the war between the systems. Former US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger commented that “what we are trying to engineer in some of these countries is clearly a
revolution,” while Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan proclaimed that “one of the most
fundamental effects of the Asian crisis was ‘a worldwide move toward the Western form of free
market capitalism’ instead of the competing Asian approach that only a few years ago looked like an
attractive alternative model for nations around the world” (NY Times, 2/13/98).  This triumphalism
was summed up nicely by a Wall Street Journal headline which simply stated, “We Won”.
But our analysis suggests that this will turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory.  The ultimate cause of
the Asian crisis lies in the contradictions of the global Neoliberal regime itself, most fundamentally
in its chronic deficiency of aggregate demand. The policies of the IMF constitute one of the system’s
many sources of demand restraint. In response to the outbreak of recurrent financial crises built into
the structure of the Neoliberal regime, the IMF has imposed austerity policies on scores of
developing countries. Asia had been the only high-growth area in the world over the past twenty
years. In the 1990s about half the growth in global GDP took place in East and South East Asia, even
though only about 25 % of global production originates there. By ‘conquering’ Asia and forcing it
into deep recession and perhaps depression, the IMF has increased global demand deficiency
qualitatively. This cannot help but accelerate the ferocity of predatory and destructive competition
sweeping global markets, creating even more severe problems of profitability, excess capacity,
financial instability, banking crises, and commodity price deflation.
Current estimates of the expected rate of decline of real GDP in Asia in 1998 include: 2.5%
in Japan, 15% to 20% in Indonesia, 7% in Malaysia, 8% in Thailand, 5% in Hong Kong, and 8% in
Korea (New York Times, October 2, 1998). The impact of this economic collapse and the massive
capital flight accompanying it has already spread to Russia, Latin America, and to US financial
markets.  Forecasts of a mild US recession in 1999 are now commonplace. With 40% of global GDP
generated by countries already in recession, the end of growth in Europe and the US would quite
likely lead to a global depression and deflation of historic proportions. In the end, even the global
elites who created the Neoliberal regime and have received disproportionate shares of its booty will
be unable to insulate themselves from the destructive dynamics they have unleashed.
VII. Policy Implications
Our analysis of the Korean crisis puts substantial emphasis on the large flows of short-term
foreign capital that flooded the recently liberalized Korean economy in the mid 1990s. Such
emphasis is consistent with the focus placed on large, volatile short-term capital movements in most
mainstream and heterodox writings on the Asian crisis. Clearly the $105 billion change in net capital
flows to Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines--from a $93 billion net inflow in
1996 to a $12 billion outflow in 1997--an amount equal to more than 10% of the area’s pre-crisis26
GDP, played a major role in triggering the problems under review. This would be equivalent to a
change in net capital flows of about $850 billion in the US  economy, which would create an
unimaginable degree of instability in US financial markets.
However, we have also attempted to look beneath unstable cross-border financial flows to the
structure of the global economic regime within which these financial dynamics were taking place. A
complete understanding of the causes and consequences of the Asian crisis, encompassing ultimate
as well as proximate causes, requires an investigation of the basic contradictions of the global
Neoliberal regime. But we stress the importance of a theory of the Neoliberal regime not just because
it helps us better understand the current crisis, but also because it creates a policy perspective quite
different from the one associated with most mainstream and heterodox crisis studies.
Neoclassical economists who acknowledge the existence of flaws in global capital markets
have proposed that developing countries that experience foreign exchange problems be permitted to
utilize certain kinds of temporary controls on inward, but not outward, short-term capital
movements. Many heterodox economists go further. They support the use of permanent capital
controls as part of the reconstruction of new versions of the East Asian model, ones better suited to
current economic conditions and based on more genuine democratic control of the state than were
their predecessors. See, for example, Chang (1998).
But our analysis of the crisis suggests that neither of these policy positions is fully adequate,
either to repair the damage caused by the current global economic crisis, or to guide the creation of  a
global economic environment within which long-term, sustainable, egalitarian, high-employment
growth is possible in both the North and the South. If we are correct, no new Golden Age era will be
possible unless and until the fundamental structures and policies of the global Neoliberal regime are
destroyed and replaced by institutions that support buoyant global aggregate demand, facilitate
egalitarian national public and private sector institutions and rules-of-the-game, and tolerate different
national paths to economic development. Of course, our argument does not suggest that pursuit of
objectives short of a reconstitution of the structures of the global economic system are not of the
utmost importance. On the contrary, the reimposition of national capital controls in pursuit of the
reconstruction of effective and progressive national industrial policies are quite likely preconditions
for success in the larger project. The key point is this: if we do not create global institutions that
support such progressive national programs, it is far less likely that anyone will be able to
successfully construct and maintain them.
________________________________________
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Street-Treasury-IMF Complex,” New Left Review No. 228, March-April.Figure 1: Systemic Interactions in the Golden Age and Neo-Liberal regimes
The Golden Age period, 1946-71
International financial relations:
Bretton Woods fixed exchange
rates; national controls over cross-
border capital movement; small
amount of stateless money
⇒
National economic policy: use aggregate-
demand management to maintain low
unemployment, engage in planning and market
regulation to meet national goals
⇓⇓
Firm objectives: Co-respective





Political context:  Government regulation
dictates how firms can compete in markets.
Widespread public support for progressive
taxes, redistributive government policy. Greater
equity as a result
The Neo-Liberal regime, 1980-present
International financial relations:
flexible exchange rates with
chronic devaluations, eroding
controls over cross-border capital
movement; large volume of
stateless money
⇐
National economic policy: retreat from
aggregate-demand management; low-inflation
target is substituted for low-unemployment
target. Market-dictated resources flows instead
of planned allocation of resources. Beggar-thy-
neighbor moves in foreign exchange markets
⇑⇑
Firm objectives: Multinational
firms engage in coercive
competition based on price-
cutting and wage-slashing, seek
financial profits from foreign-
exchange position-taking
⇒
Political context: Political choices are restricted
by multinational firms’ threats; deregulation
and regressive tax-policy shifts are forced. Less
equity results. Public support focuses on policy
rules (balanced-budget, tax levels) not on
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Figure 7: Long-Term Capital Inflows, Four East Asian Countries,
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Two years have passed since this essay was published in International Papers in Political
Economy. Our analysis, like many others at that time, emphasized the singular importance of the
Asian financial crisis. In our view, market forces unleashed in this crisis had largely broken the
power of the global economy’s only significant remaining bloc of government-directed
economies. And with the passing of the “Asian economic miracle,” the possibility of an
alternative to neo-liberal policies was severely wounded. Now, much more is being written about
the reemergence of Asian economic growth. While the World Bank subtitled its September 1998
retrospective on East Asia “The Road to Recovery,” its mid-2000 update, “Recovery and
Beyond,”  reports with some relief, “East Asia is once again the world’s fastest growing region”
(v). Why has this occurred? And what then is the meaning of the Asian financial crisis?
A postscript cannot hope to definitively answer these questions. Instead, paralleling the
logic of our 1998 paper, we first comment on changes in the global context of the Asian crisis.
We then dissect the substance of the East Asian recovery by examining Korea post-crisis.
East Asia
The World Bank sets out its views about the questions above in “Recovery and Beyond.”
The Bank argues that “harsh but quick adjustment” has done its job; now further steps permitting
integration with the global economy are needed.  And “the international community can help by
developing a framework that makes capital flows more manageable and less volatile and by
continuing to reduce trade barriers” (2). The report’s ensuing pages point out that growth in the
five most affected large countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand)
shifted from –8 percent in the fourth quarter of 1998 (on a year-over-year basis) to +8 percent as
of the third quarter of 1999. A closer reading finds a less euphoric picture. Korea’s rebound in
1999 is most dramatic, but should not be overstated, as we discuss below. And Thailand’s 1999
rate of growth was less than its 1998 decline, while Indonesia had negative growth in both 1998
and 1999.
How has this partial recovery been achieved? Have Japan, the US, and Europe’s
advanced economies been behind these trends? It seems unlikely. US economic growth is robust,
but may be unsustainable. For one thing, US growth appears to be built on the unstable ground of
a consumption boom linked to consumer debt accumulation and rising asset prices, and to an
increasingly debt-heavy corporate sector. Further, this growth has lead to an historically
unprecedented trade deficit. The combination of a booming stock market, government surplus,
trade deficit, and capital-account inflow can be sustained only under increasingly implausible
scenarios.
By contrast, other advanced nations’ growth has slowed or behaved erratically. In
particular, Germany’s growth rate fell from 2.3 percent in 1998 to a lower level in 1999 before
recovering slightly in early 2000. China’s growth rate has also slowed. The exception to this
pattern is Japan. It reversed its 1998 negative growth of –2.8 percent and climbed to a still-
anemic 1 percent growth rate. Given that Japan’s growth rate is the tail that wags the pace of
East Asian expansion, as Figure 5 suggests, Japan’s reversal may explain much of the overallEast Asian recovery. This is hardly an encouraging sign, since Japan remains mired in an
intractable structural crisis involving political paralysis, a tottering banking structure, and a
numbed and dissatisfied population.
It is important to remember that before the crisis, East Asia was the world’s growth
leader on the basis of its models of state-led growth. With the subsequent damage to and even
dismantling of these models, there is no reason to believe that East Asia will resume this global
role. East Asia’s remarkable growth has resulted in part from dense trade and investment
interrelations, but also from exports to other nations, especially advanced countries. Now, this
region’s growth depends even more on the pace of demand in the rest of the world economy.
And what about global growth? Overall, world economic growth fell from a pace of 4.2
percent in 1997 to 2.5 percent in 1998 before rising again in 1999 and early 2000. Much of the
renewed pace of global expansion is driven by the historically unprecedented US trade deficit,
which has helped East Asia’s recovery both directly and indirectly (by absorbing EU exports and
facilitating EU import demand). This good news is offset by two factors: first, the revived
growth rate remains anemic relative to the pace of global labor-force growth; second, the US
trade deficit is unsustainable in the long run, a fact reflected in the increasing turbulence of US
financial markets. In sum, if the picture of global stagnation we described in 1998 has brightened
at all, it is only at the expense of deeper global structural imbalances.
Our 1998 paper attributed weak global growth rates to the mutually reinforcing problems
of insufficient growth in aggregate global demand and to chronic excess aggregate supply. Weak
aggregate demand was in turn traced to five factors: forces holding down wages and mass
consumption; high real interest rates; restrictive fiscal policy; the level and character of global
investment; and the IMF.  Among OECD nations, wages have increased only anemically since
1997; interest rates have climbed even higher; fiscal policies remain tight; and investment
spending still flows systematically to lower-wage locations in both the developed and the
developing world. So four of the five factors remain operative. The only exception is that the
IMF has at least temporarily lost its grip as an enforcer of neo-liberal discipline. This has given
developing economies more scope for pursuing policy mixes that have permitted recovery. But
these policies’ effects are dampened because they are being pursued while the advanced
countries are pursuing go-slow economic policies.
For the five crisis countries, recovery from the brink is due to structural adjustments
associated with wrenching downturns. These nations have rebuilt their reserve via large trade
surpluses. These have been compiled despite flat export performance through the collapse of
imports. Facilitating this recovery, as the World Bank noted, has been a shift toward looser fiscal
policy. Budgetary surpluses relative to GDP have become more negative; from a 1997 range of
zero to –1 percent, these five nations’ ratios by 1999 had slipped to a range of –3 to –7 percent.
Note that this shift occurred during a period in which external pressure and “partnership” with
the World Bank have forced the IMF to back off.
These five countries’ structural improvements have not come without cost. All five
experienced a severe contraction in investment, as Figure 4 documents. Already heavy debt
levels have worsened, and banks’ non-performing loans have reached unprecedented levels: 40percent in Thailand, 35 percent in Indonesia, 20 percent in Korea. Poverty has become more
widespread, and households generally are contending with far greater economic insecurity.
The IMF, World Bank, and advanced countries’ leadership have taken a distanced view
of these adjustments and trends;  for example, the above-mentioned World Bank report mentions
“Legacies of crisis – and the new vulnerability” (11) without any apology. But by identifying
effects without naming causes, this official discourse raises more questions instead of answering
them. Consider the World Bank’s discussion of looser fiscal policy as a factor in East Asian
recovery. Do the larger deficit/GDP ratios signal activist policies that have helped in the
resumption of growth, or are these ratios the (passive) result of the collapse of public revenues?
Are the IMF and other capital providers now permanently permitting nations to maintain larger
negative deficit/GDP figures without punishment? Or is this an emerging point of difference
between the World Bank and the IMF?
Korea
We now revisit Korea, addressing three important questions about Korea’s experience
under IMF sponsored economic restructuring since late 1997. First, has the Korean economy
undergone the miraculous economic recovery that neoliberals have claimed? Second, how have
labor and the broad majority of the Korean people fared under neoliberal restructuring? Third, to
what degree have the forces of global neoliberalism transformed the Korean economy from its
state-guided past to its intended market dominated future?
In the last year and one half, Korea’s economy has become a poster child for IMF
restructuring.  The Asian Development Bank describes Korea’s “economic recovery and
financial stabilization” following the crash of 1998 as “remarkable.” By creating “flexibility” in
Korea’s notoriously “rigid” labor markets, aggressively tearing down the remaining barriers to
imports and to real and financial capital inflows, shoring up the collapsing financial sector, and
replacing the dead hand of government with private market forces, neoliberals argue, President
Kim Dae Jung has brought Korea back from the edge of depression to a long-term, high-growth
path in record time.
Evidence in support of this view is not hard to assemble. After falling almost 7 percent in
1998, Korean real GDP grew over 10 percent in 1999. While this two year growth of 3 percent is
dramatically below the 15 percent that might have been expected in the absence of the Asian
crisis, it does seem impressive given the trying circumstances of the period. The rate of
unemployment, which peaked at 8.4 percent in early 1999, is approaching 4 percent in 2000 as
the expansion continues. Korea’s balance of trade, which had slipped to minus 5 percent of GDP
in 1996, was a record $40B in 1998 -- over 10 percent of GDP, and $25 B in 1999. In
combination with a huge inflow of foreign capital, these trade surpluses rebuilt Korea’s foreign
reserves toward comfortable levels. Most important, in the view of G7, IMF and World Bank
leaders, has been the dramatic economic restructuring under President Kim’s strong leadership:
the transformation of a corrupt and inefficient pre-crisis “crony capitalism” to an open,  market-
driven economy, though still incomplete, assures that the initial post-crisis rebound will be self-
sustaining.
A closer look at the data, however, suggests that the recent Korean “miracle” may not be
all that miraculous.  The modest GDP growth between 1997 and 1999 was created solely by ahuge swing in the trade balance. GDP minus net exports was actually 9 percent lower in 1999
than in 1997. And the large cumulative trade surplus was achieved not by a significant rise in
export earnings, but through a collapse in imports brought on by the deep recession and a
dramatic fall in Korea’s exchange rate. Per capita real gross national income – an index of
economic performance that takes account of the impact of deteriorating terms of trade on
national living standards -- fell almost 20 percent over these two years. Figure 5, which depicts
several nations’ GDP in dollar terms, gives some indication of the scale of this decline.
Moreover, future export performance will obviously deteriorate unless the US continues to run
record trade deficits, European growth does not decline, and exchange rates in China and Japan
do not turn against Korea. Even under present favorable external conditions, the trade balance is
approaching zero. Turning to non-trade categories, real consumption only attained pre-crisis
levels in 2000, with much of its 1999 rebound driven by the increased spending of upper-income
families enriched by increasing inequality. Fixed capital formation in 1999 was 18 percent below
1997's value, and is only now rebounding towards pre-crisis levels. Finally, note that after the
initial period, in which the US and IMF brought the Korean economy to its knees by insisting on
balanced government budgets and sky-high interest rates, both monetary and fiscal policy
became quite expansionary. But Neoliberal authorities are now demanding a shift to fiscal and
monetary conservatism to guard against inflation. In sum, the bounce-back after 1998 was based
on temporary, not sustainable developments, and longer term growth prospects are nowhere near
as rosy as neoliberals claim.
Beneath the macro level, the effects of the crisis on the labor movement and the bottom
80 percent of the income distribution suggest that the situation is even worse. The IMF’s most
important demand in its negotiated deal with Korea, reflecting the priorities of both domestic and
foreign capital, was for deep, immediate ‘reform’ of Korea’s flexibility-constraining labor laws.
And in February 1998, mass firings as a managerial prerogative were legalized, even in Korea’s
giant conglomerates. Taking advantage of their new legal powers and the collapse in demand,
chaebol firms fired about 30 percent of their workers on average. As demand picked up in 1999
and 2000, firms hired mainly part time or temporary labor. As a result, the percentage of Korean
employees with permanent or regular jobs, already among the lowest in the industrialized world
before the crisis, fell dramatically, from 58 percent in 1995 to 47 percent in mid-2000, causing a
sharp rise in worker insecurity. So while the unemployment rate has fallen -- almost to 4 percent,
at this writing, still double the pre-crisis rate -- the percent of permanent employees shows no
sign of rising. Indeed, interviews with top-level chaebol representatives by one of the authors in
June 2000 confirmed that Korean capital is determined to drive this percent even lower. No
OECD country is close to Korea in this index of job and income insecurity; on average, 87
percent of employees in OECD nations have permanent or regular job status.
The leaders of the militant, democratic Korean Confederation of Trade Unions made
valiant efforts to slow the juggernaut of  neoliberal restructuring. Days lost to strikes were triple
the 1997 level in both 1998 and 1999, and militant labor actions continue. The KCTU even tried
to organize general strikes in 1998 and 1999 to break the restructuring momentum. To date, these
efforts have not been successful for several reasons. Kim Dae Jung has met labor activism with
fierce repression, including the arrest of virtually all union leaders involved in strike activity. The
labor movement is still divided: the more conservative, pro-government  Federation of Korean
Trade Unions has refused to join forces with the KCTU. Moreover, the ever increasing split in
the workforce between permanent and temporary workers makes it increasingly difficult for the
KCTU to maintain labor unity. The media is universally anti-labor, and labor has no major allies,because the middle class fears that labor activism will destabilize the recovery, and the once
powerful progressive student movement is virtually non-existent now.
While it would be imprudent to rule out a new outbreak of effective labor militance,
realistically, prospects for labor do not look good. Continued government repression and chaebol
aggression can be expected. Real wages have only now regained pre-crisis levels and job
insecurity grows ever greater.
Meanwhile, inequality of income and wealth is rising rapidly. The Gini coefficient, which
equaled .28 in 1997, now stands at .32; and the ratio of the income of the highest quintile of
households to that of the lowest quintile has risen by 22 percent in just two years. Indeed, the real
income of the top 20 percent rose substantially both in the collapse of 1998 and in the recovery
of 1999. Meanwhile, the income of the 80 percent of housholds constituting the bottom four
quintiles fell in both years by a total of almost 20 percent. Not surprisingly, poverty has also
worsened since the crisis. The urban poverty rate, which stood at 8.5 percent in 1996, rose to 19
percent in 1998 before falling slightly to 15 percent. Korea, a country proud of its tradition of
social solidarity, is discovering that there are no exceptions to the rule that neoliberalism
generates rising inequality everywhere.
A full discussion of economic restructuring cannot be undertaken here. However, some
important trends can be mentioned beyond the structural deterioration of labor rights addressed
above. The most pressing problem facing the incoming Kim government was the collapse of a
banking system overburdened with bad loans. To deal with this threat, the government injected a
huge amount of public funds into the financial system; Standard and Poor estimated the ultimate
cost at $125B, or about 29 percent of 1999 GDP. In effect, the banking system was temporarily
nationalized. President Kim then used control of the banks to dictate structural change to the
heavily indebted chaebol. Under the traditional Korean state-led growth model, high debt-equity
ratios for chaebol companies were the norm, but liberalization followed by the outbreak of crisis
in 1997 -- with its 30 percent interest rates, bank credit crunch, and collapsing sales -- left the
highly indebted chaebol in extreme financial risk. Intent on rapidly installing a neoliberal regime,
and on taking advantage of the public’s hatred of the families that controlled the chaebol, Kim
Dae Jung demanded that the chaebol specialize on a smaller set of business areas and cut their
debt-equity ratios from approximately 5 to under 2 in two years. He threatened to destroy them if
they failed to do so, by cutting off credit from their main banks, which the government now
controlled. Of course, in near-depression conditions, these firms could meet this demand only by
selling off many of their assets to pay off their debts; since domestic firms were illiquid, such a
process was guaranteed to dramatically increase foreign control of Korea’s economy. On paper
at least, the chaebol have now met this requirement, though their absolute level of debt has
dropped only about 10 percent. Most of the improvement has come in the denominator of the
ratio, as firms raised the accounting value of their assets and issued new stock.
Just as President Kim intended, the forced sale of stock and real assets opened to door to
an unprecedented rise in foreign ownership and control of the Korean economy. Foreign direct
investment poured into Korea. After running between one and two billion dollars for most of the
1990s, inward FDI from early 1998 through early 2000 totaled almost $30B. It is projected to
reach $20B in 2000 alone. Almost all of these inroads were achieved via mergers and
acquisition; Korea thus gained few new real assets in return for this massive transfer of corporate
control to outsiders. The full opening of the Korean stock market to foreigners,  along with the
outpouring of new stock offerings by chaebol firms pressed to lower debt-equity ratios, vastlyincreased the function of the stock market as a market for corporate control,  and increased its
volatility -- the KOSPI stock price index was 350 in late 1997, rose to near 1000 in mid 1999,
and dropped to about 600 in September 2000. About $10B of net foreign money flowed into the
Korean stock market in the past two years. Foreigners owned only 12 percent of the Korean
stock market in late 1997, but 30 percent by early 2000.
Mainstream economists applaud the contribution these inflows of foreign capital to
Korea’s foreign exchange holdings. But these inflows have a longer-run downside: Korea is
clearly losing control of its economic destiny to those who do not have its interests at heart.
Much of the recent economic expansion was concentrated in a few key industries – such as
semiconductors, telecommunications, and autos, all of which are falling under strong foreign
influence. The Korea Times (7/17/2000) reported that foreigners owned 44 percent of
semiconductor shares, and 21 percent of telecommunication shares. The situation in autos is well
known. Renault bought Samsung auto (at about 10 percent of the value of its assets), Daimler-
Chrysler is increasing its influence over Hyundai-Kia, and Kim Dae Jung has announced that
Daewoo, Korea’s largest auto maker, must be sold to foreign interests, even though its sale will
bring little money, perhaps $3B, less than 3 percent of the cost of the government’s bailout of the
financial system. The Financial Times (6/27/2000) sees “the possibility that the entire [Korean
auto] sector, the second largest in Asia, could soon be dominated by foreigners.” Forbes
(9/18/126), in an article titled “If You Can’t Beat Em, Buy Em,” predicts that the cash-rich Big
Three in autos will soon take control of Daewoo and Hyundai for the express purpose of
preventing the Korean firms from becoming serious competitors in the most profitable parts of
the market – SUVs, sedans and minivans. That is, they wish to keep these companies from
developing – hardly a wonderful prospect for the Korean economy.
In our view, then, the widely advertised neoliberal Korean ‘miracle’ is largely fraud. The
sources of growth to date are unsustainable, intermediate term impediments to growth are
numerous,  and the restoration of long-term growth at historic rates is unlikely. The labor
movement and the vast majority of the Korean people are clearly worse off because of neoliberal
restructuring. Even the chaebol -- who are delighted by the decline in labor’s power -- might
sometimes wish they could put the genie back in the bottle, as their independence from foreign
control rapidly vanishes. The trends in FDI and stock ownership, including the recent rise in
foreign ownership of financial institutions, clearly reinforce a key concern raised in the body of
our article in late 1998: Korea has moved substantially if not irrevocably towards a situation in
which future Korean governments will be structurally incapable of guiding or regulating the
Korean economy in the interests of the people of Korea.